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Abstract
Recent developments in the theory and practice of care for persons with dementia 
have reopened questions, traditionally explored by theologians, to do with the nature 
of personal identity and its dialectical relationship to social recognition. This new 
perspective on classical theological questions serves as a potential theological resource 
in contemporary western society, where God appears to have withdrawn from the 
prevailing public discourses. In this article, I explore the analogical potential of imag-
ery of a ‘dementing God’, as a way to describe the contemporary experience of west-
ern Christians, to develop appropriate responses to the current climate in public 
theology and to continue to talk of God in public, while respecting Bonhoeﬀer’s 
desire to celebrate a secular world in which humanity may ‘come of age’.
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Introduction
You show me two faces,
That of a ﬂower opening
And of a ﬁst contracting
Like the gripping of ice.
You speak to me with two
Voices, one thundering
On the ear’s drum, the other
One mistakeable for silence.
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Father, I said, domesticating
An enigma; and as though
To humour me you came.
But there are precipices
Within you. Mild and dire,
Now and absent, like us but
Wholly other—which side
Of you am I to believe?
Like much of his poetry, this piece by R. S. Thomas speaks of his encounter 
with God, and speciﬁcally of its strangeness and intractability. My ﬁrst 
encounter with the poem was in a book on dementia since, as Goldsmith 
(the author of the book) points out, the dialogue with the dementing person 
can be ‘uncannily described’ in this way.1
Whether we like it or not, we are accustomed to thinking of God as a ven-
erable old man. Yet to confuse that image with one of a dementing old man, 
perhaps burbling or screaming, perhaps dribbling and incontinent, is shock-
ing and maybe even blasphemous. We have to ask, then, what gives Thomas’ 
poem about God resonance in relation to the experience of dementia, and 
how that translocation of images in turn informs our theology.
By way of an answer to the question of resonance, we may note that 
observing the progress of dementia2 is both a distressing and increasingly 
familiar part of our experience, as dementia becomes increasingly common 
across the western world. For many, the experience is one of a soul-crushing, 
painful struggle against the departure of a loved one, in which abstract philo-
sophical and theological questions crop up in the most practical ways imag-
inable.3 Dementia forces us to ask what constitutes a person before God, and 
how it is that we continue to recognize them when the accustomed markers 
of personality are disappearing. Conversely, some carers might speak almost 
1) R. S. Thomas, Counterpoint (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1990), as cited by Mal-
colm Goldsmith, Hearing the Voice of People with Dementia: Opportunities and Obstacles (Lon-
don: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1996), p. 6.
2) I am using this term instead of the now-common ‘Alzheimer’s disease’, for reasons I will dis-
cuss in the text, although no terminology is ideal for these purposes. See Richard Cheston and 
Michael Bender, Understanding Dementia: The Man With the Worried Eyes (London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1999).
3) For example, Donald Keck refers to Alzheimer’s as ‘The Theological Disease’; David Keck, 
Forgetting Whose We Are: Alzheimer’s Disease and the Love of God (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1996), p. 38. 
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mystically of their relationship with the dementing person, an ineﬀable 
‘I-Thou’ quality that persists even when the conventional features of relation-
ship have long gone.
The theological issue is less straightforwardly answered. It seems to me that 
Thomas is not by any means the only Christian in the last century or so to 
ﬁnd that the God they thought they knew has become elusive and meaning-
less; their words seem to have become hollowed out from within, God’s ‘per-
sonhood’ and ‘identity’ seem to have leaked away, becoming shadowy and 
conventional. ‘Father God’ is becoming opaque to us and is in the process of 
dissolution; not dying, not ﬂeeing, but dissolving, becoming incommunica-
tive and incommunicable. Like a dementing old man, God is receding from 
us, and we are perplexed at how to respond. Our God is a dementing God.
It is worth remembering that this sense of God’s withdrawal is a distinc-
tively western (perhaps narrowly European) phenomenon, and that secular-
ization has not taken place on the global scale that Max Weber’s successors 
have at times predicted.4 Furthermore, in the western context there are many 
people for whom this withdrawal does not present any great challenges; 
indeed, for some people, such as Richard Dawkins,5 the disappearance of 
God is an accomplished and unremarkable fact, while theology is a curious 
survival of a bygone age. For others, such as Stanley Hauerwas,6 their ﬁdeist 
or emotivist commitments eﬀectively insulate them from the secular chal-
lenge, since they believe in or ‘feel’ God without reference to the wider world 
of experience and reason in which the question of plausibility might arise. 
However, there are some of us for whom secularism still presents a challenge, 
if not to God’s existence, then to God’s meaning. We believe in God, for 
what it’s worth, but we have diﬃculty recognizing God, ﬁnding any ‘point’ 
to God. In a world where human personhood itself seems no more a ‘given’ 
than the personhood of God, we sense a common cause with God; a sense 
that if we let God go so easily, humanity will start to slip through our ﬁngers 
in the same way. Frankly, we miss God; thus, even dementing, we are not yet 
ready to let God go.
I am aware that by using the phrase ‘dementing God’, I may be setting 
some false trails. To clarify, I am not seeking to diminish or humiliate God; 
4) See William H. Swatos, Jr and Daniel V. A. Olson, eds, The Secularization Debate (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2000). 
5) Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam Press, 2006).
6) Stanley Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).
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that is, this is not so much about what God is in Godself as about our per-
ception of God in the public sphere. There is no question of God suﬀering 
some kind of physical-neurological impairment and of ‘losing his mind’. 
Instead, I want to focus on the changes that dementia eﬀects in a person’s 
relationships, their roles and place in wider society, and the connection of 
this to a ‘malignant social psychology’ that both reﬂects and contributes to 
their deterioration.7 It is in this latter sense that I intend to talk of God as 
dementing: of becoming increasingly unrecognizable to us and marginal to 
our social concerns, to the point of becoming an inconvenience and an 
embarrassment.
Secondly, I am not proposing a model of ‘dementing God’ along the lines 
of Eiesland’s ‘Disabled God’ or Isherwood’s ‘Fat Jesus’,8 as an example of the 
way our restricted imagery for God excludes certain persons. I am instead 
seeking to drive the analogical process in the opposite direction, beginning 
from the assumption that our restricted imagery for persons excludes God, 
and that to enrich that imagery is to create new opportunities for naming, 
recognizing and celebrating the presence of God in the contemporary world. 
As times and contexts change, so the ‘person’ of God must be rendered anew 
in our discourse: as a way of negotiating life, as a duty to God, and ﬁnally 
because we cannot stop theologizing. We need to reﬂect on the world in 
which we ﬁnd ourselves, and from that build a conception of God that 
responds to that world.
The proposal I will explore and develop is that, for those of us who are 
western theologians seeking to make sense of God in a predominantly secular 
context, there is much to be learnt from those whose profession is the under-
standing and care of people with dementia. The day-to-day experience of 
being in the presence of persons who do not bear the conventional marks of 
personhood; the daily challenge of interpreting words and gestures that have 
ceased to carry conventional content; the forced critiquing and challenging of 
notions of human worth and even of human life; these are all related analo-
gously to the day to day challenge of living with a ‘dementing God’. The 
majority of this article will therefore be an attempt to ‘theologize’ some 
7) See Tom Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered (Buckingham: Oxford University Press, 1997) and 
Clive Baldwin and Andrea Capstick, eds, Tom Kitwood on Dementia: A Reader and Critical 
Commentary (Buckingham: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
8) Nancy L. Eiesland, Disabled God: Towards a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1994) and Lisa Isherwood, The Fat Jesus: Feminist Explorations in Boundaries and 
Transgressions (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2007).
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insights from the world of dementia care. Although at times it will be neces-
sary to make distinctions, I will treat those writing in the ﬁeld of dementia 
care as if they were writing theologically, and so avoid a rather cumbersome 
separation between description and application of a writer’s thought.
Dementia and the Medicalization of a Social Problem (or Vice Versa)
As western society ‘takes leave of God’,9 it is convenient to blame the patient, 
or at least ‘his’ apologists on earth.10 The notion of God has become sick, oti-
ose, irrelevant and disruptive to our independent, driven and demanding 
lives. We cannot be blamed for jettisoning the concept in such an apparently 
unfeeling manner, because God has demented.
To follow up the analogy that I am developing, it is instructive to reﬂect 
on a parallel tendency in responses to those who are dementing: the tendency 
to treat dementia in medicalized and individualized ways that, in eﬀect, cast 
the whole situation as due to changes in the ‘patient’. The ‘default position’ 
in dementia care is to treat it not as a social phenomenon but as a medical 
one; as the result of changes in an individual’s brain, over which society has 
no control and in response to which it can only oﬀer medical intervention. 
Furthermore, dementia is treated as a problem within the individual; an 
‘internal’ matter that is supposedly independent of the actions and reactions 
of those around the aﬀected person. This is well demonstrated by the increas-
ing prevalence of the term ‘Alzheimer’s Disease’ for any form of progressive 
mental impairment in a hitherto ‘normal’ person. A disease is nobody’s fault, 
and external to both ‘patient’ and their circumstances; thus, it implies a con-
trast with health and normality, and so creates an expectation of the patient 
as passive victim.11
There is however an alternative paradigm, which understands the term 
‘dementia’ as at least partly to do with the way a person is perceived, under-
stood and located within a social and historical setting. Hence, while personal 
change is inevitable, it is ‘malignant social psychology’ that de-positions the 
dementing person and so pathologizes them. In other words, while the indi-
vidual is undoubtedly losing some cognitive capacity, the consequences of 
 9) Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (London: SCM Press, 2001). 
10) I am using the masculine pronoun for God to reinforce the analogy between traditional 
imagery for God and that of a ‘dementing old man’.
11) See Cheston and Bender, Understanding Dementia. 
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this loss are intimately connected with their social and historical circum-
stances.12 Thus, in Kitwood’s ‘dialectical model’ of dementia, there is a vicious 
spiral in which changes in the individual lead to their increasing marginaliza-
tion, disempowerment and isolation, and these are conditions that in turn 
accelerate and contribute to a further round of decline.13 According to Sabat, 
‘malignant social positioning’ detracts from the self-appreciation of the 
dementing subject and so contributes to the situation it aims to help; that is, 
language of loss actually takes away from both carers and subject.14 The prob-
lem is not simply a malfunction in a person’s brain, but a malfunction in the 
philosophical and theological underpinnings of society’s understandings of 
‘person’.15
On this model, what ‘dements’ is not so much an individual as an entire 
socially held world of meanings; whereby meaning becomes impaired, forget-
ful and erratic in a shared malignant process. From this perspective, we may 
begin to see what it might mean to talk of the ‘dementia’ of God: a whole set 
of relationships, shared meanings and assumptions breaks down, with the 
result that God appears to have become opaque to us, to have withdrawn 
from or become unresponsive to us, to have become forgetful of us.
As in the care of a dementing person, our response to this ‘dementing 
God’ should be a self-reﬂective one. Rather than focussing exclusively on a 
change in the individual (over which we have little control), we should pay 
close attention to our social reactions (over which we should have much more 
control). God is unlikely to have changed, but the only God we can know is 
the one who appears as a participant in our socially constructed world, in 
which the ‘communion of saints’ constructs an image of God as it constructs 
the church. If God seems to be withdrawing from us, it is because our deep 
assumptions of what God’s presence with us looks like are being challenged. 
12) Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered and Tom Kitwood, ‘Person and Process in Dementia’, in 
Baldwin and Capstick, eds, Tom Kitwood on Dementia, p. 67.
13) Baldwin and Capstick, eds, Tom Kitwood on Dementia, p. 12.
14) Steven R. Sabat, ‘Mind, Meaning and Personhood in Dementia: The Eﬀects of Positioning’, 
in Julian C. Hughes, Stephen J. Louw and Steven R. Sabat, eds, Dementia: Mind, Meaning and 
the Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 287–302.
15) ‘one’s basic view of aging, and thus of people who are elderly (and perhaps especially cogni-
tively impaired) is not a scientiﬁc factual matter at all, though obviously certain facts are rele-
vant. The question of attitudes towards aging—what it means to grow old and how one should 
relate to people who are old—is a theological/philosophical question, that is, a question of 
value and ultimately of faith’; Stephen Sapp, ‘Memory: The Community Looks Backward’, in 
Donald McKim, ed., God Never Forgets: Faith, Hope and Alzheimer’s Disease (Louisville: West-
minster John Knox, 1997), pp. 38–54 at p. 54.
 P. Kevern / International Journal of Public Theology 4 (2010) 237–253 243
To understand God’s ‘dementing’ we must examine the contemporary chal-
lenge to previous assumptions about God.
Diagnosing the Dementia of God
As we have noted, the care of a dementing person challenges in a particularly 
sharp way our understanding of what it is to be a person. We do not, by and 
large, respond to the suspicion that somebody’s brain is faulty; rather, we 
respond to the tragic sense that somebody’s personhood is ebbing away, 
which may be expressed in statements such as ‘she is no longer the person she 
used to be’ and ‘he’s been dead for ages—he just hasn’t stopped breathing 
yet’.16 Our working understanding of ‘personhood’ is typically inductive 
rather than analytic; in other words, we infer that there is a person ‘in there’ 
because of the way they behave ‘out here’, in the social world, as is easily 
demonstrated by an analysis of the stories of and about dementing people.17 
The key issues are behavioural rather than metaphysical, and are interrelated 
in complex ways.
First, there is narrative integrity. As memory declines, so does the person’s 
ability to give an account of how they got here and what carries meaning in 
their life. If, for example, a woman has devoted her entire life to the nurture 
and care of her children, then at the point where she no longer recognizes 
them the inference may be that she is herself no longer recognizable as the 
person she once was. Secondly, there is intentional activity. A disturbance in 
the person’s behaviour is often the ﬁrst symptom of dementia to the casual 
observer; such that their activity may appear to be inexplicable and spas-
modic, with no clear plan or outcome. As such, the process by which we infer 
the presence of an intentional agent is interrupted. Thirdly, there is social 
interaction. It is clear that people with dementia often become less able to 
interact with the social world at a pace and in a way comprehensible to those 
around them, thus becoming both socially and politically invisible. Although 
16) In one case of ‘mercy killing’ of a demented person by their carer, the judge showed leni-
ency, stating: ‘[you] tried to care for a woman, who ceased to be the woman you married’; BBC 
News (2003), reported by Carmelo Aquilina and Julian C. Hughes, ‘The Return of the Living 
Dead: Agency Lost and Found?’, in Hughes, Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, pp. 143–63 at 
p. 144.
17) See, for example, Robert Davis, My Journey into Alzheimer’s Disease (Oxford: Tyndale House 
1986) and Elizabeth Forsythe, Alzheimer’s Disease: The Long Bereavement (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1990).
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often overlooked, this is the most obvious of the senses in which one may be 
said to be a ‘person’. The term is a linguistic one, and as such follows a set of 
shared rules and meanings. Hence, one is a person to the extent to which one 
is recognized as such, is noticed, valued and heard within the world. A ‘per-
son’ who has no weight in the social and political world is hardly worth the 
name. Thus, as Kitwood notes, depersonalization takes place by a combina-
tion of internal and external factors.18
It is perhaps only when these key characteristics are obscured that our 
dependence on them for the inference of a personal ‘identity’ becomes clear; 
that is, without them, the individual seems to melt away to nothing. We have 
to consider, therefore, the extent to which the ‘person’ still is in existence 
when the characteristics associated with them are all in ﬂux.19
If these perceived changes provide the reasons why we may conclude that 
somebody has ceased to be an identiﬁable person, then we may expect to ﬁnd 
analogous changes in the recent history of western religion that generate the 
sense that God is ‘dementing’. First, at the level of narrative integrity, for 
many it is no longer plausible to claim that the Scriptures or the traditions of 
the church tell a single uniﬁed story of God’s dealings with the created order, 
and one which univocally locates him within a narrative that includes us. 
Secondly, God is not generally understood as an intentional agent in the 
details of history, intervening to accomplish particular purposes in a way that 
suspends the natural order of things. Finally, and perhaps because of the 
other changes, God has simply dropped out of public discourse, so that theo-
logians at best struggle to generate a shared conversation about God, while 
Rawlsians advocate relegating the term ‘God’ to the restricted language games 
of bounded faith-communities.20 God has at best a phantom presence in our 
public discourse.
However, in the light of the discussion above, we should note that we 
actively collaborate in the creation of each other’s ‘identities’, providing the 
prompts for memory, the arena for action and the social status that contrib-
utes to them. Analogously, God’s apparent withdrawal says something about 
18) Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered, p. 8.
19) See Keck, Forgetting Whose We Are, p. 122: ‘the phenomena of Alzheimer’s render the self-
conscious subject as the ground for theological and religious life highly suspect. Because the 
real experiences of patients are so contrary to the experiences of consciousness, it is simply 
unclear how . . . theologies can address adequately the theological dimensions of dementia with-
out compromising . . . assumptions’.
20) John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
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our inability to ‘make space’ for God on the one hand, and our inability to 
perceive God’s presence on the other. If we share responsibility for each oth-
er’s identity, it follows that there are things we can do to create a more 
responsive environment and attend more closely to God. There are also 
things that we may have to learn, or relearn, before the face of a God who is 
no longer communicating with us in the accustomed manner. Thus, we are 
all implicated in the disappearance of God by virtue of the fact that we sup-
ply the social context: the perceived withdrawal of God is symptomatic of 
deterioration in a whole set of relationships. The literature on care for those 
with dementia proves to be rich in insights that can be used to address this 
deterioration.
Caring for God—Reconstructions
When we turn to consider the ways in which the personhood of the ‘dement-
ing God’ may be supported and even reconstructed in the speech and activity 
of the Christian community, three overlapping themes are identiﬁable in the 
literature on dementia care that merit consideration in a theological frame-
work.
Rementing—Restoring the Missing Links
One of the more controversial theories in dementia care suggests that, because 
neurological impairment is only one of a number of factors in dementia and 
because memory is socially held in a collaborative process, some degree of 
reversal, of ‘rementia’ is possible.21 This means that when an individual’s abil-
ity to remember starts to falter, others may ‘hold’ that memory for them by 
surrounding them with familiar elements and orientating them by familiar 
landmarks in their own story. To the extent that personhood itself depends 
upon memory and a sense of narrative continuity, we may even say that they 
hold and support that individual’s integrity as a person by, for example, 
reminding them of recent events and decisions and locating these within a 
narrative framework.22
An essential element of Christian devotion is a ‘rementing’, or more famil-
iarly ‘anamnesis’, reconstituting God’s identity and presence by recounting 
21) See Baldwin and Capstick, eds, Tom Kitwood on Dementia, pp. 16–18.
22) See Julian C. Hughes, Stephen J. Louw and Steven R. Sabat, ‘Seeing Whole’, in Hughes, 
Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, pp. 1–39 at p. 16.
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God’s story. Although the focus of this process is typically seen as the remem-
bering community (including those who themselves have dementia),23 I 
would argue that it is of signiﬁcance for the identity of a ‘dementing God’. 
God inhabits the story as it is being told; God’s identity becomes rendered in 
the present through the retelling of the story of the past.24
Like carers surrounding the dementing person with familiar emblems and 
landmarks, we surround God with memories drawn from shared tradition 
and personal testimony. The identity of the ‘people of God’ is dialectically 
linked to the regular rementing of God; God and God’s people come into 
being together and take their identity from each other. As with the presence 
of a dementing relative, in the religious community we scatter around 
reminders of our relationship, so that in re-membering God we may ourselves 
be remembered.25
Benign Social Psychology?
As we have noted, when God drops out of public discourse, God’s very iden-
tity is in question. According to Wittgenstein, words are necessarily signiﬁers 
of shared meaning, and to have a ‘private’ meaning for a word is an oxymo-
ron.26 The closed circles of discourse described, for example, by Lindbeck’s 
‘cultural-linguistic theology’ or Fish’s communities of interpretation will, 
therefore, only take us so far.27 Lindbeck and Fish preserve a discursive niche 
for God, but at the price of insulating the term from the wider, overlapping 
discourses in which we all take part. It is as if the dementing God is allowed 
to potter around in the care home, but must on no account be allowed out to 
23) Stephen Sapp, ‘Memory: The Community Looks Backward’, in McKim, ed., God Never 
Forgets, pp. 38–54 at p. 52.
24) See, for example, Thomas W. Mann, The Book of the Torah: The Narrative Integrity of the Pen-
tateuch (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1988), p. 150.
25) The relational ontology developed by Zizioulas raises the intriguing possibility that such re-
membering may have ontological weight such that God’s being may be co-constituted in the 
worship of the community, but Zizioulas would have been horriﬁed by this notion. Cf. John 
Zizioulas, Being as Communion (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985) and John 
Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness (London: T&T Clark, 2006).
26) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 
Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 4th edn (Wiley-Blackwell, [1953] 2009), pp. 98–99.
27) George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Phil-
adelphia: Westminster, 1984); Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Classroom? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
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breathe the fresh air. We need to ﬁnd meanings in the wider world of dis-
course, if our God is to have a home there.
There is a range of emergent resources in theology for talk of a God in a 
wider discourse. The most promising candidate may be the Girardian claim 
that the Christ-story has had a thoroughgoing subversive eﬀect on ‘Christian’ 
societies, by shifting their dominant perspective from that of the powerful to 
that of the victim.28 We might also consider the theme of a God who is in 
history, and so interwoven with discourse, such as Moltmann’s or that of pro-
cess theology.29 Perhaps the image of a dementing God is an example of a 
vulnerable and participatory God.
Reﬂection: On ‘Constructing’ What Is Not There
The constructivist approaches above recognize both the truth of the other and 
our responsibility to maintain our side of the relationship, which is intensi-
ﬁed when the other is incapable of maintaining their side of it. Such 
approaches resist the notion that God has ‘gone’ or become a ‘husk’ of an 
idea, and, in Post’s terminology, provide ‘prostheses’ for the images of God 
that have been lost to us.30 Thus, these approaches emphasize that, as ‘God’ 
ceases to be an assumed social fact, more of the burden of construction falls 
to us: we have to grow up, and take responsibility for deﬁning God in the 
way that ‘God’ used to take responsibility for deﬁning us. To put this in the 
idiom of dementia care, then, we are to take responsibility for ‘Active, Col-
laborative Authorship of the Self-narrative’31 on behalf of God.
There are some limitations and dangers inherent in arrogating to ourselves 
the task of deﬁning God. The alienation of a person’s ‘identity’ from her or 
himself to the community is potentially oppressive in that it suggests that we 
are no more than the social powers make us,32 and to avoid this trap we must 
assume an independent existence for God, whether we recognize it or not.33 
This is the other, ‘essentialist’ pole of the dialectic; that is, there is indeed a 
28) René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (Leominster: Gracewing, 2001).
29) Jürgen Moltmann, The Cruciﬁed God (London: SCM, 1974); Charles Hartshorne, Omnipo-
tence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University of New York, 1984), pp. 20–26.
30) Stephen G. Post, ‘Respectare: Moral Respect For the Lives of the Deeply Forgetful’, in 
Hughes, Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, pp. 223–34 at p. 229.
31) Hughes, Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, p. 15.
32) Tim Thornton, ‘The Discursive Turn, Social Constructionism, and Dementia’, in Hughes, 
Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, pp. 125–41.
33) ‘Personhood . . . can be bestowed, it can . . . be equally easily withheld’; Baldwin and Cap-
stick, eds, Tom Kitwood on Dementia, p. 180.
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God who is in communication with us, albeit in ways that we have diﬃculty 
recognizing and interpreting. With a renewed attention to God’s social being, 
there must be renewed attention to God’s communicative being.
Beyond Constructivist Responses
People with dementia appear to have ceased to communicate, and construc-
tivism is one response to that fact. A complementary response is to treat the 
breakdown in communication as a social problem suggesting that there may 
be an attempt to communicate, which we are unable to recognize. There is an 
increasing body of literature that proposes the complementary approach, and 
seeks signs among people with dementia of a continuing, though changed, 
self-expression.34 For example, silence or a refusal to cooperate can be read as 
responses to a situation, rather than as ‘diﬃcult episodes’ or behavioural dis-
turbance.35 By analogy, we may ask in relation to the dementing God what 
positive consequences arise from God’s apparent withdrawal and silence, 
from which we may infer God’s continued involvement with our future.
Critique of Infantilism
The question of God’s apparent disappearance as an intentional agent in the 
physical world has been extensively worked over throughout the twentieth 
century by Christians, sceptics and atheists alike. In conceding to the mod-
ernist critiques, scholars may argue that to seek a God who occasionally inter-
venes in an otherwise ordered universe is to set out on the wrong quest, and 
so to overlook the obvious explanation that the relationship of God to the 
world is not one of an isolated intention that issues in a discrete action, 
instead it is one of a constant creative and participative presence, which may 
be discernible by us in diﬀerent ways and to diﬀerent degrees.36
One of the most inﬂuential reworkings of this theme was in Bonhoeﬀer’s 
famous letter of 16 July 1944, in which he criticizes the infantilizing eﬀect of 
religion, stating: ‘Man’s religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power 
of God in the world: God is the deus ex machina’, and Bonhoeﬀer contrasts 
34) See Lisa Snyder, ‘Personhood and Interpersonal Communication in Dementia’, in Hughes, 
Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, pp. 259–76.
35) Aquilina and Hughes, ‘The Return of the Living Dead’, in Hughes, Louw and Sabat, eds, 
Dementia, pp. 143–61.
36) See Owen C. Thomas, ed., God’s Activity in the World: The Contemporary Problem (Atlanta: 
Scholar’s Press, 1983).
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this with the need, in a secular world, to live etsi deus non daretur.37 His sug-
gestion that God allows himself (sic) to be edged out of a secular world and 
onto the cross so that humanity may come of age resonates with the idea of a 
dementing God, whereby God may be withdrawing so that we can ‘come of 
age’, grow up and take responsibility both for ourselves and our God.
Rebirth of Institutions
The current situation of God’s ‘dementing’ need not uniformly be expressed 
in terms of loss but, by analogy with dementia care, be understood as a 
reconnection with the unpredictability of God, for our healing and growth. 
As Shabahangi points out, there are beneﬁts to accepting a person with 
dementia on their terms, since the ‘dreamland’ they inhabit invites us to 
attend again to the way in which we marginalize fantasies and suppress those 
human attributes that do not contribute to the achievement of our goals.38 
By insight into the ‘otherness’ of dementia, there may be the opportunity to 
recover our creativity, playfulness and sense of timelessness. Shabahangi 
states: ‘This otherness allows for the road less travelled, allows us to live our 
life in the way important to us, not necessarily in the way prescribed for us’.39
Such a transformation has been evident in the recent history of dementia 
care, which has seen the conversion of institutions, from standard measure-
ment techniques and protocols of treatment to the recognition that each per-
son with dementia is dementing in a diﬀerent way, and at a diﬀerent rate, so 
that institutional responses just will not do.40 The beneﬁts of this reformation 
of institutional life have been enjoyed not just by those involved in dementia 
care but at a number of points where persons and institutions intersect. 
Imagination and creativity ﬂourish best at the points where habitual solutions 
and responses become impotent.
Paradoxically, it has been as the western church has had to grapple with 
the elusiveness and intractability of images of God that its ecclesial and theo-
logical imagination has been unleashed. In the face of God’s otherness, the 
37) Dietrich Bonhoeﬀer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. John Bowden, ‘Letter to Eberhard 
Bethge [Tegel] 16 July 1944’, (London: SCM Press, [1953] 2001), p. 134.
38) Nader Robert Shabahangi, ‘Redeﬁning Dementia: Between the World of Forgetting and 
Remembering’ (December 2005), p. 7, <http://www.paciﬁcinstitute.org/events/nader_demen-
tia.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2010].
39) Ibid., pp. 4–5.
40) Although, sadly, the economic and social realities of dementia care sometimes leave them as 
the only options.
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church has been unable and unwilling to maintain a pattern of lock-step con-
formity, of the sort that could persist in more certain times. The way of disci-
pleship in the current climate is necessarily one of active theological 
imagination, in which creativity and ﬂexibility have a high premium and 
ﬁxed institutional patterns quickly prove inadequate.
Critique of Social Values
In addition to the reformation of our institutions, attention to those with 
dementia has called into question the essentially Stoic values of control, 
thrift, rationality and success. According to Post, it invites us to a more rela-
tional understanding of life together that draws on the shared Jewish and 
Christian value of ‘[e]qual regard based on cognitive, emotional, rational and 
symbolic-expressive aspects’.41 Perhaps God has not changed, but we have 
forgotten the communicative values that would enable us to communicate, 
but in communion with people with dementia, we have the opportunity to 
ﬁnd them again.
As Christians know, communication before the face of the other requires a 
contemplative slowness, a self-giving and willingness to be moved from one’s 
own place of security. Thus, Goldsmith states:
Often, diﬃculties encountered when communicating can be attributed to the 
pace of the interaction. Communicating with a person with dementia can be a 
slow process. We must be prepared to devote an adequate and appropriate 
amount of time to this task. Very often metaphors may be used, which need to 
be interpreted. Not having enough time and therefore making little progress is 
not the same as saying that the person is unable to communicate. Communica-
tion may be extremely diﬃcult because, for whatever reason, we are not able to 
devote an adequate amount of time to that speciﬁc task.42
If ‘God’ were to replace ‘person with dementia’ in the passage above, it might 
easily have been taken from any manual on prayer in the last hundred years. 
A ‘dementing God’ is one who shows us the importance of time, of engage-
ment and attachment. What has been lost is not so much the ‘presence’ of 
God, as our communicative familiarity with it, in a world where our imagi-
native and communicative landscape is changing faster than we are able to 
follow.
41) Post, ‘Respectare’, in Hughes, Louw and Sabat, eds, Dementia, p. 233.
42) Goldsmith, Hearing the Voice of People with Dementia, p. 76. 
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As well as the activism of the ‘constructivist’ responses, then, the strange-
ness of our current experience of God recalls us to a contemplative way of 
relating. The recession of a clear imagery for God, disturbing and disorientat-
ing as it may be, has some positive eﬀects in that it opens up a space in which 
to grow up, to develop new ways of listening and new communicative prac-
tices. As a long tradition of mystical theology in both western and western 
churches testiﬁes, it is at the point at which the images break down that a 
revelation of God can take place.
Conclusions
At the beginning of this article, I noted that there is a ‘transcendent’ element 
to the care of people with dementia that is evidenced, for example, in the use 
of Thomas’ poetic descriptions of God. The apparent eclipse of someone’s 
identity and personhood in dementia bears comparison with the apparent 
withdrawal of God in the late modern era. In Keck’s words:
We may ask if caring for an Alzheimer’s patient is analogous to the worship of 
God. In both cases, according to some, you do it because it is right, not because 
you expect any reward, let alone enjoy the comfort of recognition. Both caring 
for a loved one who no longer knows your name and praying to God in a world 
full of suﬀering can be quite painful, even bitter.43
Conversely, at this time of the withdrawal of God, we are called to exercise 
great care, great attention to detail. There is an ‘apophatic’ element to this 
project, a recognition that our images of God were always inadequate and 
that their erosion is an opportunity to grow into the darkness; there is also a 
‘kataphatic’ element, a recognition that it is our responsibility to care for the 
image of God, to ‘rement’ God in our current social context.
Hence the rhetorical balance shifts from expecting God to take care of us, 
to us taking care of God. No longer our provider, God appears now as our 
dependent. It is no longer God telling us who we are, but us telling God who 
‘he’ is. This can be done with care, with attention, with collaboration and 
respect; but it is not a task we have a right to refuse.
When this perspective is brought to bear on the imagery of the ‘old man 
in the clouds’, which Bonhoeﬀer feared perpetuated us in a state of infantile 
dependency, some fertile lines of thought open up. The paternalist imagery 
43) Keck, Forgetting Whose We Are, p. 17.
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that Bonhoeﬀer criticized carried with it the burden of its origins in geronto-
cratic societies in which the metaphor of great age connoted God’s authority, 
power and self-suﬃciency. God has been allied with the sources of secular 
power, in relation to whom our proper status is that of children; yet, such a 
God, if ‘he’ loves us, may well allow ‘himself ’ to be pushed out in order to 
enable us, in Bonhoeﬀer’s words, to ‘come of age’.44 He states:
And we cannot be honest unless we recognize that we have to live in the world 
etsi deus non daretur. And this is just what we do recognize—before God! God 
himself compels us to recognize it. So our coming of age leads us to a true recog-
nition of our situation before God. God would have us know that we must live 
as men [or women] who manage our lives without him. The God who is with us 
is the God who forsakes us (Mark 15.34). The God who lets us live in the world 
without the working hypothesis of God is the God before whom we stand con-
tinually. Before God and with God we live without God. God lets himself be 
pushed out of the world on to the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, 
and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps us. 
Matt. 8.17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us, not by virtue of his omnipo-
tence, but by virtue of his weakness and suﬀering.
Here is the decisive diﬀerence between Christianity and all religions. Man’s 
religiosity makes us look in our distress to the power of God in the world: God 
is the deus ex machina. The Bible directs man to God’s powerlessness and suﬀer-
ing; only the suﬀering God can help. To that extent we may say that the devel-
opment towards the world’s coming of age outlined above, which has done away 
with a false conception of God, opens up a way of seeing the God of the Bible, 
who wins power and space in the world by ‘his’ weakness. This will probably be 
the starting-point for our ‘worldly interpretation’.45
Nevertheless, it would be premature to shelve all images of ‘father God’ or to 
replace it with an equally inﬂexible belief in God’s absence. As history shows, 
such a strategy may have the eﬀect of strengthening its subconscious power 
and leaving us prey to father-images among our political and religious lead-
ers. Instead, we may seek to renew the image in ways that incorporate God’s 
powerlessness and suﬀering.
The imagery of the ‘dementing God’ may subvert and re-present the 
father-image in a new way. In contemporary society the ‘old man’ is a ﬁgure 
of fun, connoting powerlessness and dependency. It is allied with those oth-
44) Bonhoeﬀer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. John Bowden, ‘Letter to Eberhard Bethge 
[Tegel] 16 July 1944’, p. 134.
45) Ibid.
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ers ‘written out’ of society, the members who no longer ﬁt, covered by stories 
told of how the outcast ‘prefers it that way’. Theologically, one expression of 
the theme of a God who ‘became weak for us’ may be in this very imagery. 
This is the face of marginalization, and to be countercultural in such a cli-
mate is to exalt the ﬁgure of the old man, to ‘re-member’ it in as many ways 
as we are able, to attend to it and allow ourselves to be changed and re-
formed in the light of it. This construction of God’s presence can be respon-
sive both to God and to contemporary society; further, if it challenges the 
yearning of theologians for eternal truths and all-powerful ﬁgures that will 
insulate them from history that too may be a good thing.

